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The Continued Salience of Religious Voting in the United 
States, Germany, and Great Britain* 
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Abstract 
 
Conventional wisdom on party systems in advanced industrial democracies holds that modern 
electorates are dealigned and that social cleavages no longer structure party politics.  Recent 
work on class cleavages has challenged this stylized fact.  The analysis performed here extends 
this criticism to the religious-secular cleavage.  Using path analysis and comparing the current 
electorates of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain with the early 1960s, this paper 
demonstrates that the religious-secular cleavage remains or has become a significant predictor of 
conservative vote choice.  While the effects of the religious-secular cleavage on vote choice have 
become largely indirect, the total of the direct and indirect effects are substantial and equivalent 
to the effects of class and status. 
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1. Introduction 
The current state of the literature on party systems maintains that electorates are 
dealigned from their political parties (Dalton, 2006; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen, 1992; 
Knutsen, 2006; Daalder and Mair, 1983; Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, 1984).  Where close ties 
between the principal social divisions of society and the political parties once existed, electorates 
now are considered ―floating‖ without party loyalties (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000).  These 
studies have focused on how the effects of social characteristics become insignificant when in 
the presence of the more proximate determinants of the vote, such as ideology, issues, candidate 
evaluations, and retrospective voting (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Franklin, 1985; Inglehart and 
Klingemann, 1976; Inglehart, 1984; Knutsen, 1988).  However, examining the effect of the 
social cleavages in this way potentially masks their continued importance for structuring the 
party system, because social cleavages may determine those more proximate predictors of vote 
choice.  This oversight has led to potentially erroneous conclusions that the sociopolitical 
cleavages in contemporary voting behavior no longer have important effects. 
A burgeoning literature argues that such statements as the ―death of class‖ and other 
social cleavages are premature or even unfounded.
1
  This is particularly so with regard to the 
religious-secular divide (Layman, 2001; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Mulligan, 2008; Layman 
and Carmines, 1997; Elff, 2007, 2009; Ang and Petrocik, n.d.).  As the social cleavage dividing 
the religious from the secular has intensified over time despite secularization, so has the political 
cleavage: religious voters have become an increasingly tempting base of support for conservative 
parties to target, given religious voters‘ inclinations toward conservative moral traditionalism 
and seculars‘ general affinity for moral progressivism (Layman and Carmines, 1997).   
                                                 
1
 This literature is too long to cite adequately here, but important recent works include, Bartolini and Mair, (1990); 
Elff (2007, 2009); Weakliem (1995); Manza Hout, and Brooks (1995); Brooks and Manza (1997); Chan and 
Goldthorpe (2007); van der Waal, Achterberg, and Houtman (2007). 
 2 
This paper examines the effect of the religious-secular cleavage in relation to the other 
traditional social cleavages within the contexts of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain 
in order to determine if the religious-secular divide remains a meaningful source of political 
conflict.  These three cases present an interesting test of the salience of the religious-secular 
cleavage because they represent three different trends in the strength of the religious cleavage 
within the literature: a declining trend in religious voting in Germany, an upward trend in the 
United States, and no trend, remaining low in Britain.  By examining the effects of the social 
cleavages on partisanship and vote choice over time, this paper tests whether the religious-
secular divide still affects vote choices in these three electorates.   
Additionally, this paper examines the effects of the religious cleavage on three short-term 
forces (left-right self-placement, party leader preference, and economic evaluations) argued to 
have displaced social cleavage effects.  Following the logic of the Michigan model's funnel of 
causality (see Dalton, 2006: 178; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008: 23), incorporating social cleavage 
variables and short-term forces into the same model, without first dealing with problems of 
endogeneity, masks the persistence of the religious-secular cleavage.  The analyses show that 
social cleavages structure the more proximate determinants of vote choice.  After dealing with 
these problems of endogeneity, the effects of religious voting remain sizable, especially when 
compared with class and status effects as well as with the short-term forces.  These findings 
support the argument that the religious-secular cleavage remains an important determinant of 
vote choices in these three countries, and perhaps cross-nationally as well. 
2. Weakening Social Cleavages 
 The social cleavage approach to the study of party systems, as articulated by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967), argues that party systems ―freeze‖ around the principal social divisions at the 
 3 
outset of democratization, which in turn structure the economic and social conflicts that come to 
form the bases of party systems.  While Lipset and Rokkan emphasized the impact of class, 
religion was also noted as a significant source of electoral support.  Rose and Urwin (1969) 
differed from Lipset and Rokkan slightly by documenting that while class was indeed one of the 
most important bases of party systems cross-nationally, religious divisions surpassed class as the 
principal basis.  The general findings of these seminal studies of the formation and freezing of 
party systems appeared confirmed by other research conducted around the same time (see Rose, 
1974).   
 However, other researchers took notice of the increasing electoral volatility in late 1960s 
and 1970s and began to question whether electorates really were ―frozen‖ around the principal 
social cleavages (Pederson, 1983; Dalton 1996; 2006).  As a result of changing social 
conditions—including the post-War economic boom, higher levels of education, and the 
secularization of society—many scholars began to contend that a dealigning process was taking 
place in which the ties between social groups and parties had broken (Daalder and Mair, 1983; 
Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, 1984; Dalton, 2000; Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg, 2000; 
Franklin, Mackie, and Valen, 1992).  Cross-nationally, the major parties have experienced 
significant declines in membership and partisanship; even those who identify with a political 
party do so with less vigor than before (Dalton, 2000, 2006; Arzheimer, 2006; Zelle, 1998).  
While most scholarship on the subject has focused on the class dealignment
2
 (Franklin, 1985; 
Robertson, 1984; Heath et al., 1991; Knutsen, 2006; Lane and Ersson 1999; Manza, Hout, and 
Brooks, 1995; Brooks and Manza, 1997; Rose and McAllister, 1990; van der Waal, Achterberg, 
and Houtman, 2007; Weakliem, 1995; Dalton, 1996; van der Waal et al., 2007), other works 
have made the same case with regard to the religious-secular cleavage (Dalton, 1996, 2006; 
                                                 
2
 For a dissenting voice on topic of class dealignment using ecological data, see Bartolini and Mair (1990). 
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Franklin, Mackie, and Valen, 1992; Knutsen, 2004).  As a result of declining rates of religious 
observance and the overall secularization of society, these authors contend that religious beliefs 
these days have less direct influence on individuals‘ voting calculi than forty years ago (Franklin, 
Mackie, and Valen, 1992; Knutsen, 2004). 
 Some have viewed this dealignment as a precursor to an eventual realignment of party 
loyalties among social groups (Petrocik, 1987).  Yet others have argued that electoral volatility 
and party dealignment have become permanent features of modern electorates.  These scholars 
have shown that while voters have become less partisan, they have instead become more 
ideological (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Inglehart, 1984; Knutsen, 1988) and have 
experienced a transformation of values from material to postmaterial concerns and ‗new politics‘ 
issues (Inglehart, 1977, 1997).  Issues, candidate and economic evaluations also have become 
more proximate to individuals‘ vote choices than traditional social divisions (Franklin, 1985; 
Lewis-Beck, 1988; Schoen, 2007; Vetter and Gabriel, 1998; Dalton, 1996, 2006). 
 As a result of these changes in the electorates, political parties have come to reflect the 
changing nature of the times.  This can be seen, for instance, in the ‗new politics‘ stances of 
―New Labour‖ which dropped clause four (calling for the complete nationalization of industry) 
in the early nineties and reflected a shift in their electoral strategy of targeting voters at the 
political center—in this case, middle class employees who hold leftist-libertarian values.  This 
follows a broader pattern of similar realignments and repositioning by parties of the left 
elsewhere (Lipset, 2001).  This shifting of electoral strategies represents larger changes which 
have occurred in party systems cross-nationally.  Further evidence of party system change can be 
seen with the return of the Liberals (now Liberal Democrats) as a viable political party in Great 
Britain, with the rise of the Greens in Germany, and with the realignment associated with the 
 5 
breakup of the New Deal coalition in the United States (Petrocik, 1987).  In each case, the parties 
have responded to the changes induced by the emergence of the ‗new values‘ cleavage(s) and 
significant shifts in the party system have occurred at the individual level as a result. 
3. The Continued Salience of the Religious Cleavage 
 Most of the studies on realignment and coalition shifts have focused on the social 
democratic parties of the political left or the extremist parties of the right with particular interest 
in class alignments (see Veugelers, 2001; Oesch, 2008).  However, emerging research suggests 
that religious values also continue to form an important base of electoral support for parties of 
the right.  Although religious observance has declined significantly in recent years, emerging 
evidence suggests that those who remain faithful continue to comprise a highly salient political 
cleavage cross-nationally (Elff, 2007, 2009; Layman, 2001; Schmitt, 1998; Norris and Inglehart, 
2004; Norris, 1997; Ang and Petrocik, n.d.).  In fact, religious-secular differences remain the best 
predictor of vote choice among the traditional social cleavages (Dalton, 1996).  If anything, 
recent theoretical developments suggest that instead of diminishing, the political salience of 
religious-secular differences actually increases with societal development and secularization as 
the demand for religious services increases among those who remain religiously faithful 
(Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel, n.d.). 
 One can see why the religious-secular divide remains one of the most significant 
predictors of political behavior among the social cleavages if one considers some of the 
characteristics religious voters share.  For one, the average religious voter self-locates on the 
more traditional end of the political values spectrum (Layman and Carmines, 1997; de Koster 
and van der Waal, 2007; De Witte and Billiet, 1999), supporting traditional values and issues of 
morality, positions which lend themselves to support for more conservative parties of the right 
 6 
(Hammond, Shibley, and Solow, 1994; Layman, 2001; Mulligan, 2008; Hout and Fisher, 2002; 
Djupe, 2000; Green and Guth, 1993).  Because churches and the sub-communities that churches 
create foster intense political socialization (Wald, Hill, and Owen, 1988) and facilitate 
mobilization for campaigns and voting (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Campbell, 2004), 
the moral traditionalism and general conservatism of many religious voters makes them tempting 
targets for conservative parties seeking to realign their bases with ardent, faithful supporters.   
 While religious and other specific cleavage-based voting is often associated with 
multiparty systems where parties have strong social group ties (Powell, 1986), religious voters 
need not have a political party that targets their votes and explicitly pursues religious issues in 
parliamentary settings (as with the CDU in Germany) in order to constitute a meaningful social 
base of support.  So long as a political party is identified by the electorate with certain issues of 
political salience—e.g. abortion, moral traditionalism, etc.—to religious voters (Petrocik, 1996), 
their interests can be articulated and votes targeted by conservative parties.  Even in two-party 
settings, parties of the right can effectively court the support of religious voters without turning 
off other voters.  Petrocik (n.d.) has shown that in the case of the United States, the Republicans 
have increasingly catered to- and received the support of religious voters.  Kotler-Berkowitz 
(2001) has similarly demonstrated that the Conservatives in Britain are the main beneficiaries of 
religious voters. 
 A large part of what makes religious voters so tempting as a base of conservative political 
support is that their social values tend to correspond with conservative political values, which in 
turn facilitates conservative party identification and voting.  Put another way, religiosity remains 
a powerful predictor because it has substantial indirect effects on conservative vote choice 
through its effects on political values and party identification.  Following the funnel of causality 
 7 
in the Michigan model of voting behavior (see Dalton 2006: 178), social cleavages (in this case, 
the religious-secular cleavage) are hypothesized to have indirect effects on the vote through their 
impact on value orientations (e.g. left-right ideology, postmaterialism, etc.) and party 
identification.  Thus, if the Michigan model is to be believed, religiosity should affect the more 
proximate predictors of vote choice. 
 The evidence suggests that social cleavages do affect these more proximate predictors of 
vote choice, and thus may in fact have indirect effects on vote choice as the Michigan model 
supposes.  In Britain, Prandy (2000) shows that social class still matters as a predictor of party 
identification.  The same effect on party identification has been observed with regard to religion 
(Layman, 2001; Djupe, 2000; Johnson, 1994; Kotler-Berkowitz, 2001).  Religiosity also appears 
to affect left-right and other political value orientations (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; 
Inglehart, 1984; Hammond, Shibley, and Solow, 1994; Jagodzinski and Kühnel, 1998; Johnson, 
1994) much as class has been shown to affect the left-right scale (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007; 
Bartle, 1998).  Additionally, religion has been shown to have an effect on other social value 
orientations associated with vote choice as well (Layman and Carmines, 1997; de Koster and van 
der Waal, 2007; De Witte and Billiet, 1999). 
 What these studies all suggest is that while social cleavages (in this case, the religious-
secular divide) may not directly affect vote choice, they do structure party identification, value 
orientations, and other short-term factors that are considered to be the more proximate predictors 
of vote choice.  Accounting for not only the direct but also the indirect effects of religiosity may 
demonstrate that the religious-secular divide continues to structure voting behavior in advanced 
industrial democracies.  However, such an argument has not been tested empirically. 
Considering the lack of scholarly focus on both the direct and indirect effects of religiosity on 
 8 
voting behavior, those arguments purporting a decrease in the importance of religiosity and other 
social cleavages for predicting voting behavior may be inaccurate.  This analysis corrects this 
deficiency by accounting for these endogeneity problems in order to present an accurate 
assessment of the effects of the social cleavages on vote choice. 
4. Data and Methods 
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the more volatile electorates of today are 
compared and contrasted with the electorates of the 1960s, prior to the period of dealignment. 
This is done in order to determine whether the effects of the religious cleavage have decreased 
from the 1960s to the present day as the literature suggests. Second, the relationships between 
social cleavages and the variables previous literature argues to be most proximate to vote choice 
are examined. This second stage deals with the endogeneity problems in the arguments holding 
that the social cleavages no longer matter to explaining vote choices. Three countries are selected 
because they represent three different patterns of associations between social cleavages and vote 
choice: a downward trend in Germany, an upward trend in the United States, and no clear trend 
in Great Britain (Knutsen, 2004, 2006). This provides appropriate variation and generalizability 
in order to test whether the effect of religiosity has declined in salience to vote choice.  
The data for the 1960s are taken from the Butler and Stokes Political Change in Britain 
surveys and the American and German National Elections Studies (ANES and GES, 
respectively). The corresponding years for the three election surveys are 1964, 1960,
3
 and 1965 
(October), respectively. Recent election data come from the first wave of the Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems (CSES), corresponding with the 1996 US presidential election, the 1997 
                                                 
3
 Because of the salience of Kennedy‘s religious practice, the 1960 ANES may be an outlier in terms of the high 
level of polarization between Catholics and Protestants, which may underestimate the effect of religious-secular 
differences.  To ensure against this, I compared the results from the 1960 ANES with the 1956 ANES and found that 
the rate of religious-secular polarization to be higher in 1960 than 1956.  Thus, the choice of 1960 appears to 
appropriately test the arguments proposed here. 
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British general election, and the party list ballot (Zweitstimme) for the 1998 German Bundestag 
elections.
4
 For the sake of comparability across time, only data from West Germany are used 
from the 1998 German election.  All data were accessed online through the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.  
The two dependent variables used in the first stage of the analysis are (1) respondent vote 
choice and (2) party identification. Using party identification in addition to vote choice provides 
a robustness check because the social dealignment literature discussed above suggests that the 
links between social cleavages and party identification have been severed much like the links 
between social cleavages and vote choices. Because religious voting is a generally conservative 
phenomenon in advanced democracies, a binary distinction is made between conservative and all 
other parties.  Conservative parties in these three cases include the Christian Democratic Union 
and Christian Social Union in Germany, the Conservative Party in Great Britain, and the 
Republican Party in the United States.  Probit regression is used for these analyses.  
The main independent variable, the religious-secular cleavage, is measured as frequency 
of attendance of religious services.  To deal with potential spuriousness, the effects of the 
religious-secular divide are examined in relation to other social cleavages.  The other variables 
include three measures of status and class
5—income, union membership, and attainment of a 
                                                 
4
 To ensure that the analyses and results reported here were not specific to the elections examined here, the results 
derived from the first wave of the CSES were compared to the second wave of the CSES as a robustness check. 
Using the second wave of the CSES did not alter the results and conclusions presented here in a substantial way. 
These results are presented in the Supplementary Material section. 
5
 While it would have been desirable to include additional, direct measures of class (i.e. variables that specifically 
measure occupational differences between middle and working class positions), comparable data for objective and 
subjective class variables were not available in all the election surveys. However, the variables employed here 
adequately tap the differences between the haves and have-nots: income differentials measures the differences in 
material benefits derived from employment, union membership controls for class consciousness, and including a 
binary variable for university graduates addresses the effects of higher education on status attainment. 
 10 
university degree—voting disparities among religious denominations,6 gender, a variable 
controlling for urban residence, long-term regional voting disparities—southern states in the US 
(Black and Black, 1987) and Scotland in the UK (Bennie, Brand, and Mitchell, 1997)—and a 
variable controlling for African Americans in the United States.  All missing responses are 
listwise deleted.   Because my focus is restricted primarily to the religious-secular cleavage—and 
the class/status cleavage for the sake of comparison—I do not present parameter estimates for all 
of the variables (though these can be obtained from the author upon request).  See the Appendix 
below for detailed explanations of variable measurements. 
Because the Michigan model suggests that social cleavages ultimately have indirect 
effects on vote choice, the effects of the social cleavages on the more proximate determinants of 
vote choice are also examined.  Relying solely on the first wave of the CSES because of data 
availability for the short-term forces, three such measures are chosen.  These include left-right 
ideological self-placement, a measure of party leader preference for the leader of the party of the 
right used in the dependent variable, and evaluations of recent economic performance.  Left-right 
self-placement and party leader preference are both measured ranging from zero to ten.  Low 
values on the left-right scale correspond with the political left and higher values with the political 
right.  Low values of candidate/party leader preference represent animosity towards the party 
leader while higher values correspond with favorability.  Economic performance ranges from 
one to five, where one represents very good economic performance and five represents very bad 
economic performance evaluations.  While these three variables tested here are only an 
approximation of the larger Michigan model‘s funnel of causality (see Lewis-Beck et al., 2008: 
23; Dalton, 2006: 178), the three variables represent some of the more important determinants of 
                                                 
6
 This variable is intended to control for the denominations most likely to vote for the conservative parties in order 
to demonstrate that the religious-secular divide is occurring across denominations.  The denominations included 
under this heading include Catholics in Germany, Anglicans in Britain, and Protestants in the United States.  
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vote choice noted by the literature.  In the second stage of the analysis, these variables are 
analyzed with linear regression estimated by ordinary least squares with robust standard errors.
7
  
The hypothesized model is presented in Figure 1.
8
 
Figure 1 about here 
The model in Figure 1 suggests that while social cleavages have some direct effects on 
vote choice, their primary impact is through other variables that are more proximate to vote 
choice.  If these more proximate determinants of vote choice are themselves determined by 
social cleavages, this would call into question arguments purporting that social divisions matter 
less to modern party systems today than in years past.  For instance, the explanatory power of 
economic evaluations to predict vote choice that is attributable to the relevant social cleavages 
would be indicative of an indirect social cleavage effect on vote choice.  Because few would 
argue that economic evaluations are causally prior to social demographics, any variance shared 
between economic evaluations and religiosity that predicts vote choice is causally attributable to 
the religiosity.  Thus, it makes little sense to include both variables in the same model without 
dealing with this endogeneity problem; failure to do so results in problematic interpretations of 
the actual effect of social cleavages on vote choice because any shared variance between social 
cleavages and the more proximate determinants of vote choice results in statistical insignificance 
for the social cleavage variables, when in fact such variables have both direct and indirect effects 
(through the endogenous variable) on vote choice.  Previous studies often, however, include all 
variables relevant to vote choice without dealing with endogeneity problems.   
                                                 
7
 See footnote 11 below with regard to the treatment of economic evaluations with different estimators. 
8
 An alternative model that more closely approximates the larger Michigan model includes party identification as a 
mediating variable between social cleavages and the more proximate, short-term forces. Because of the long-
standing critiques of the Michigan model concept of party identification—regarding the responsiveness of party 
identification to short-term forces like retrospective evaluations (Fiorina, 1981)—and because the results using this 
model are far more supportive of the social cleavage approach, I do not present this model here. Results from this 
alternative model and the model diagram itself can be found in the Supplementary Material section. 
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To deal with this endogeneity problem, this paper proposes a simple solution: before 
including the social cleavage variables in the same model as the more proximate determinants of 
vote choice, their shared variance needs to be removed.  This technique is similar to instrumental 
variables approaches: instead of generating new variables created from the values predicted by 
the social cleavages as instrumental variables approaches do, this technique generates new 
variables from that variance which is not predicted by the social cleavage variables (i.e. the 
residual values).
9
  This removes the variance from the more proximate vote choice determinants 
that is attributable to the social cleavage variables.  Such a technique eliminates the need for 
exogenous instruments—which are not readily available for each endogenous variable in the 
CSES data set.  Once this is done, the three residual variables representing the effects of the 
short-term forces variables that are independent of social cleavage effects are included alongside 
the variables from the vote choice equation.  These models are estimated, as above, using probit 
regression. 
5. Analysis 
 The first step in this analysis, examining the effects of the social cleavages across time 
periods, shows that the social cleavages have not ceased to exist.  Instead, they continue to 
predict voting behavior significantly. Table 1 presents the results of probit models using both 
vote choice and party identification as dependent variables for each country in two elections: one 
election from the 1960s and one recent election.  
Table 1 about here 
Although the results differ by country, what stands out as common to all is the 
persistence of social cleavage effects on both dependent variables over time, in spite of 
                                                 
9
 More formally, whereas the reduced form (first stage) equation in instrumental variables approaches predicts an 
endogenous variable yi = π0 + π 1x1 + … πixi, this approach predicts the residuals vi = yi – π0 – π1x1 – … πixi. 
 13 
arguments purporting significant social dealingment.  Particularly striking is the finding 
regarding the salience of the religious-secular cleavage: despite the sharp declines in religious 
observance over the past half-century (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen, 1992), the religious-secular 
divide remains a highly salient electoral cleavage in all three countries.  
While there is some evidence of dealignment in Table 1 when examining the explanatory 
power of social cleavages on vote choice, the reduction in explanatory power is not as substantial 
as the literature would suggest for either the United States or Germany, and the pseudo R
2
 
actually increases for Great Britain. With regard to party identification, the explanatory power of 
the social cleavages increases for both the United States and Great Britain; only Germany sees a 
reduction in explanatory power. These results suggest that while there has been considerable 
partisan and social dealignment among Western electorates following the Second World War, 
social identities still play a significant part in determining partisan identification (for those who 
still identify with political parties) in addition to vote choice. 
Turning to the magnitudes of the effects of the social cleavages in general and religious-
secular divisions in particular, Table 2 presents the predicted probability changes for a one 
standard deviation change in each independent variable. All nominal variables are held at their 
modal values; all other variables are held at their means. 
Table 2 about here 
The results in Table 2 suggest that in terms of the magnitude of religious-secular effects, 
there is little evidence of dealignment; only Germany provides evidence of this, and this 
dealignment effect is most pronounced with regard to vote choice and less so for party 
identification.
10
 Comparing the magnitude of religiosity effects across countries, even though 
there is a considerable drop in the effect of the religious-secular cleavage in Germany, the 
                                                 
10
 The 2002 German data show that this effect on vote choice is much stronger.  See the Supplementary Material. 
 14 
magnitude of this effect on party identification in 1998 is comparable to that of the United States, 
in which much has been made about the increased salience of religiosity effects in the past few 
decades. In both the United States and Great Britain, the effect of religiosity has remained 
constant for both vote choice and party identification, and has not decreased as the literature 
suggests. Comparing the effects of religiosity to the other variables listed in Table 2, the effect of 
the religious-secular cleavage is similar in magnitude to those variables associated with class and 
status, as well as religious denominational effects.  All things considered, the evidence shows 
that the effect of the religious-secular cleavage has remained relatively stable and important to 
determining vote choice over time. 
 Having confirmed that the religious-secular cleavage remains an important determinant in 
predicting individual vote choice and party identification in the first stage of the analysis, the 
next step is to determine whether religiosity is an important determinant of the vote through its 
indirect effects, namely through the short-term effects suggested by the literature to be more 
proximate to determining vote choice.  Table 3 presents the results of regressions of these short-
term forces on the social cleavages. 
Table 3 about here 
As Table 3 shows, the more proximate determinants of vote choice are predicted in part 
by social cleavages, indicating that these variables are in fact endogenous.
11
  Therefore, social 
cleavage effects have not been displaced by short-term forces; rather, it appears that the social 
cleavages affect vote choice indirectly through the more proximate determinants of vote choice 
                                                 
11
 This is confirmed by Hausman tests for endogeneity (Hausman, 1978). These tests determine whether the 
variables of interest are endogenous by predicting residuals from the reduced form equations (as in Table 3), then 
using the residuals as variables in the structural equations (in this case, the probit models presented in Table 4) and 
dropping the exogenous (social cleavage) variables. If the coefficients for the residual variables are statistically 
different from zero when included alongside the hypothesized endogenous variables, then the variables of interest 
are endogenous. In each case, the coefficients for the residual variables are statistically significant, indicating that 
the three short-term forces are indeed endogenous. Thus, including the social cleavage variables without eliminating 
the variance shared with the short-term forces would result in type II errors regarding social cleavage effects.  
 15 
as the Michigan model suggests.  In all but one instance, regarding economic evaluations in the 
United States,
12
 religiosity has a significant effect on the three short-term factors.  Thus, these 
results suggest that by incorporating both short-term forces and social cleavages into the same 
model would result in type-II errors with regard to social cleavage effects.   
 The suspicion of type-II errors is confirmed in Table 4.  Table 4 presents the changes in 
probabilities for a one standard deviation increase in the independent variables. The probabilities 
in the first column for each country are from probit models including all variables without 
dealing with endogeneity, while the values in column two are from models in which the variance 
shared between the three more proximate determinants of vote choice and the social cleavages is 
removed; parameter estimates for each model are presented in the Supplementary Material.  As 
Table 4 shows, the probabilities for the social cleavage variables in column one appear to be 
underestimated for each country when the problem of endogeneity in the more proximate 
variables is not dealt with. This is particularly problematic for the frequency of attendance 
measure, which is underestimated by two-thirds in the United States, while the probability in 
Great Britain and Germany is only a tiny fraction of its actual magnitude.  
Table 4 about here 
 Looking at the probabilities corrected for endogeneity in column two reveal that the 
religious-secular cleavage has a sizable impact on vote choice, both in relation to the other social 
cleavages and in relation to the more proximate determinants of vote choice. In the United 
States, frequency of attendance has the largest effect on vote choice out of all the social cleavage 
variables. While the effect of religiosity is not as large in relation to the other variables in 
                                                 
12
 One possibility for the finding of significant religiosity effects in Britain and Germany but not in the United States 
could be due to the use of OLS. Because this dependent variable is a five-point scale, one could argue that OLS is 
not the appropriate technique (the consequence being significant underestimation of the standard errors). Using an 
ordered probit model, however, demonstrates that this is not the case: the results are nearly identical, thus justifying 
the use of the simpler OLS model for the sake of comparison. 
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Germany and Britain, it is still sizable, a finding which is remarkable given the dominant role of 
the class cleavage in British politics (Alford, 1963; Butler and Stokes, 1975). Even in 
comparison to the three short-term factors that scholars argue have displaced social cleavages as 
the most important determinants of vote choice, the magnitudes of the religiosity effects on vote 
choice are not as small as one would expect. In some cases, the effect of religiosity is roughly on 
par with- or even greater than some of the individual short-term effects. These results 
demonstrate that, in addition to the findings from the first part of the analysis showing that 
religiosity effects have not disappeared over time, religiosity has sizable effects on vote choice in 
relation to other important cleavages as well as the short-term forces argued to have displaced 
social cleavage effects. 
6. Discussion 
 Similar to the conclusions of one fairly recent review essay regarding the persistence of 
class effects on voting (Evans, 2000), this essay concludes that the same can be said with regard 
to the religious-secular cleavage.  As the data show, religious-secular effects have not evaporated 
over time.  Instead, there appears to be an enormous degree of persistence: religious voters today 
continue to support parties of the right much as they did in the 1960s, both in terms of vote 
choice and party identification.  Curiously enough, the effects of the religious-secular cleavage in 
each country examined here are comparable in size to the effects of the variables associated with 
class and status, which also remain sizable. 
Furthermore, this essay contributes to the literature by showing that previous works have 
not properly dealt with issues of causal structure in determining the effects of social cleavage 
variables over time.  While theory suggests that social cleavage variables are at the beginning of 
the causal chain (or funnel: Lewis-Beck et al., 2008: 23; Dalton 2006: 178) and therefore have 
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indirect effects on vote choice that are mediated by more proximate, short-term factors, few 
scholars have properly addressed these issues of endogeneity.  This often leads researchers to 
conclude that social cleavages no longer have significant effects on vote choice when in fact they 
do.  Once these issues of endogeneity are addressed, social cleavage effects continue to play a 
significant role in determining vote choice.   
While these conclusions are not ignorant of the fact that the net contribution of religious 
voters to parties of the right has declined over time as the number of religiously adherent voters 
have declined (Best, forthcoming; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen, 1992), the results presented here 
demonstrate that social cleavages (religion in particular) still matter, and therefore the study of 
these cleavages warrants continued research.  Regardless of one‘s views toward the process of 
secularization,
13
 religion still matters for a sizable number of people (Greeley, 2003); for those to 
whom religion still matters in private, the data presented here demonstrate that religion still 
matters for their political behavior as well, affecting not just vote choices and party 
identifications but other important attitudes and behaviors that also predict vote choice.   
In conclusion, future research needs to move beyond questions of whether or not 
religiosity (and other social cleavages) still matters for politics and instead move toward 
answering questions of for what (else) religiosity matters and why.  Particularly important are the 
electoral connections between voters and parties: while some have explored the impact of 
parties‘ positions on the effects of social cleavages on party support (Elff, 2009), have religious 
voters‘ electoral demands been met on issues most important to them, or has the failure to 
address these voters‘ concerns led to the apparent partisan dealignment (visible among German 
voters in the data presented here)?  These answers remain to be seen in future research.
                                                 
13
 Norris and Inglehart (2004) defend secularization theory, though many scholars like Stark (1999) and Greeley 
(2003) have presented convincing evidence and forceful arguments that contradict many of the tenets and 
expectations of secularization theory. 
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7. Appendix 
Measurement of Dependent Variables 
 
Vote Choice 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the CDU/CSU in Germany, the Republicans in the United States, 
and the Conservatives in Great Britain, and 0 otherwise. Those who did not vote are excluded. 
This refers to the Zweitstimme (party vote) in Germany, the presidential vote in the United 
States, and general election vote in Great Britain. 
 
Party Identification 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the CDU/CSU in Germany, the Republicans in the United States, 
and the Conservatives in Great Britain, and 0 otherwise, including those with no party 
preference. 
 
Left-Right Self-Placement 
This variable is an 11-point measure of respondents‘ self-placement along a left-right ideology 
scale where 0 represents the left and 10 represents the right. 
 
Party Leader Preference 
This variable is an 11-point measure of respondents‘ ratings of the leaders of the same 
conservative parties as above, where 0 means the respondent strongly dislikes the party leader 
and 10 means the respondent strongly favors the party leader. In the United States, the party 
leader is the Republican presidential candidate. 
 
Economic Performance 
This question ask respondents, ―What do you think about the state of the economy these days in 
[country]?  Would you say that the state of the economy is very good, good, neither good nor 
bad, bad, or very bad?‖ I use the same 1 to 5 scale (very good to very bad) used by the CSES.  
 
Measurement of Independent Variables 
 
Frequency of Church Attendance  
This variable ranges from 0 to 3, with 0 referring to those who never or practically never attend 
services and 3 represents weekly or more-than-weekly attendance.  This involves recoding 
frequency of attendance variables in the CSES, GES, and Political Change in Britain Survey.  
See Table 5 for details on how this variable is recoded with respect to each of the surveys. 
 
Denominational Differences 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the religious denomination most likely to support the party of the 
right, 0 otherwise. In this research, the denominations coded as 1 are Protestants in the United 
States, Catholics in Germany, and Anglicans in Great Britain. Protestants in the United States 
include Adventists, Congregationalists, Baptists, Anabaptists, Methodists, Lutherans, Unitarians, 
Pentecostals, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Holiness, and those identifying as ―Protestant‖ 
without reference to a specific denomination. 
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Union Membership 
Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who are union members, 0 otherwise. 
 
Income 
This variable divides respondents‘ incomes into quintiles, where 1 represents the lowest income 
quintile and 5 the highest. For those surveys that use income scales with more than 5 categories, 
respondents were recoded into quintiles. This recoding is done for the 1960 ANES (in which the 
original variable was a 10-point measure), the 1965 GES (in which the original variable was an 
11-point measure), and the 1964 Butler and Stokes Political Change in Britain Survey (in which 
the original measure was a 13-point measure). For all studies but the 1965 GES and the 1964 
Butler and Stokes Political Change in Britain Survey, the variable measures household incomes. 
While the GES and the Political Change in Britain Survey both use head of household incomes, 
this does not render the measures invalid because female work force participation during this 
period was significantly lower than the present day. 
 
University Degree 
Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who have attained a four-year university degree, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Gender 
Dummy variable coded 1 for women, 0 otherwise. 
 
Regional Differences 
Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who reside in the region of interest, 0 for the rest of the 
country. The region of interest in Great Britain is Scotland. For the United States, the region of 
interest is the south, including the eleven states of the former Confederacy plus Delaware, 
Kentucky, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Washington, D.C.  
 
Urban 
Dummy variable coded 1 for urban residents, 0 otherwise. The data from the CSES all use the 
same definition for what constitutes a large city or town. In the 1965 GES and the 1960 ANES, 
respondents are coded as urban if they reside in cities with populations of 100,000 or more.  This 
variable is missing in the 1997 data for Britain and therefore is not used in the 1964 data as well. 
 
African American 
Dummy variable coded 1 for United States respondents who self-identify as racially black, 0 
otherwise.  
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Figure 1 Path Model of the Effects of Social Cleavages on Vote Choice 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1 Effects of Social Cleavages on Conservative Party Vote Choice 
(Maximum Likelihood Probit Coefficients) 
DV: 
Vote Choice 
UK 1964 UK 1997 US 1960 US 1996 GER 1965 GER 1998 
Attendance .091* 
(.032) 
.108** 
(.027) 
.177** 
(.046) 
.234** 
(.038) 
.367** 
(.045) 
.143* 
(.052) 
Religious 
Denomination 
.379** 
(.091) 
.461** 
(.069) 
1.486** 
(.123) 
.423** 
(.090) 
.421** 
(.095) 
.447** 
(.105) 
Union 
Member 
-.638** 
(.096) 
-.502 
(.080) 
-.280* 
(.132) 
-.660** 
(.136) 
-.543** 
(.127) 
-.489** 
(.143) 
Income 
 
.073** 
(.012) 
.201** 
(.023) 
.007 
(.040) 
.189** 
(.041) 
.006 
(.038) 
.130** 
(.038) 
University 
Completed 
.364 
(.232) 
-.238* 
(.102) 
.274* 
(.117) 
.055 
(.095) 
.278 
(.238) 
-.105 
(.168) 
Likelihood 
Ratio (df) 
113.75 (7) 229.98 (7) 215.57 (9) 216.29 (9) 185.66 (7) 68.42 (7) 
Pseudo R
2
 
(Cox-Snell) 
.085 .105 .204 .191 .173 .091 
n  1283 2072 944 1018 975 719 
 
DV: 
Party ID 
UK 1964 UK 1997 US 1960 US 1996 GER 1965 GER 1998 
Attendance .097* 
(.031) 
.167** 
(.036) 
.147* 
(.047) 
.241** 
(.043) 
.307** 
(.042) 
.261** 
(.078) 
Religious 
Denomination 
.420** 
(.087) 
.508** 
(.090) 
1.006** 
(.126) 
.557** 
(.105) 
.376** 
(.088) 
.263 
(.161) 
Union 
Member 
-.574** 
(.091) 
-.834** 
(.107) 
-.287 
(.141) 
-.843** 
(.168) 
-.407** 
(.121) 
-.477* 
(.197) 
Income .058** 
(.012) 
.267** 
(.030) 
-.075 
(.040) 
.264** 
(.045) 
.031 
(.035) 
.105 
(.058) 
University 
Completed 
.409 
(.221) 
-.383* 
(.135) 
.296* 
(.115) 
.024 
(.112) 
.227 
(.219) 
.115 
(.221) 
Likelihood 
Ratio (df) 
111.66 (7) 223.12 (7) 146.35 (9) 235.01 (9) 145.58 (7) 32.00 (7) 
Pseudo R
2
 
(Cox-Snell) 
.075 .172 .140 .256 .126 .097 
n  1428 1180 968 793 1082 314 
* Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .001 level.  The values presented are probit coefficients presented 
above their standard errors in parentheses. Only select coefficients are presented in the interest of space.  
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Table 2 Changes in Probability 
(Based on Results in Table 1) 
DV:  
Vote Choice 
UK 1964 UK 1997 US 1960 US 1996 GER 1965 GER 1998 
Attendance 
 
3.91 4.14 6.06 11.13 16.02 5.04 
Religious 
Denomination 
6.37 7.18 21.72 8.39 8.31 7.43 
Union 
Member 
-9.82 -7.02 -3.44 -9.19 -7.87 -6.43 
Income 
 
7.97 9.31 0.31 9.06 0.27 5.96 
University 
Completed 
2.09 -2.52 3.95 1.03 2.05 -1.11 
 
DV:  
Party ID 
UK 1964 UK 1997 US 1960 US 1996 GER 1965 GER 1998 
Attendance 4.13 6.89 5.80 10.72 
 
13.07 9.56 
Religious 
Denomination 
7.05 8.67 16.79 10.24 7.22 4.46 
Union 
Member 
-8.84 -12.81 -4.05 -10.24 -5.65 -6.88 
Income 6.28 13.77 -3.76 12.28 
 
1.40 4.93 
University 
Completed 
2.28 -4.46 4.89 0.42 1.66 1.40 
Values represent the change in probability resulting from a one-standard deviation increase in the respective 
independent variables. Probabilities are for selected variables only.  
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Table 3 Effects of Social Cleavages on More Proximal Vote Determinants 
(OLS Regression Coefficients) 
UK 1997 Religiosity Denomin-
ation 
Union 
Member 
Income University 
Education 
Adjusted 
R
2
  
Left-Right Self-
Placement 
.205** 
(.044) 
.661** 
(.109) 
-.615** 
(.107) 
.120** 
(.036) 
-.696** 
(.138) 
.058 
Party Leader 
Preference 
.379** 
(.054) 
.854** 
(.139) 
-.686** 
(.136) 
.305** 
(.044) 
.218 
(.175) 
.079 
Economic 
Performance 
-.061** 
(.014) 
-.235** 
(.035) 
.174** 
(.037) 
-.121** 
(.012) 
-.124* 
(.049) 
.097 
  
USA 1996 Religiosity Denomin-
ation 
Union 
Member 
Income University 
Education 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
Left-Right Self-
Placement 
.323** 
(.046) 
.309* 
(.114) 
-.385* 
(.162) 
.031 
(.048) 
-.428** 
(.132) 
.078 
Party Leader 
Preference 
.253** 
(.052) 
.609** 
(.131) 
-.739** 
(.173) 
.217** 
(.055) 
.158 
(.138) 
.094 
Economic 
Performance 
-.013 
(.019) 
.066 
(.048) 
-.032 
(.073) 
-.027 
(.022) 
-.262** 
(.051) 
.068 
 
Germany 1998 Religiosity Denomin-
ation 
Union 
Member 
Income University 
Education 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
Left-Right Self-
Placement 
.278** 
(.080) 
.291 
(.161) 
.262 
(.225) 
.127* 
(.057) 
-.202 
(.230) 
.033 
Party Leader 
Preference 
.550** 
(.105) 
.406 
(.212) 
-.508* 
(.263) 
.113 
(.076) 
-.114 
(.301) 
.061 
Economic 
Performance 
-.168** 
(.048) 
-.069 
(.099) 
.158 
(.120) 
-.069* 
(.035) 
-.331* 
(.155) 
.056 
* Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .001 level.  The values presented are unstandardized regression 
coefficients presented above their standard errors in parentheses. Only select coefficients are presented in the 
interest of space. 
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Table 4 Changes in Probabilities of Vote Choice 
 
 UK 1997 US 1996 GER 1998 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
Left-Right Self-Placement 16.12 14.15 18.76 18.68 12.16 11.39 
Party Leader Preference 18.39 16.08 46.68 46.07 20.16 18.66 
Economic Evaluations -10.21 -8.79 9.38 9.50 -4.07 -3.74 
Attendance 0.66 5.27 5.64 15.84 -0.21 5.80 
Religious Denomination 3.90 8.97 3.88 12.47 6.23 8.19 
Union Member -3.16 -7.00 -6.15 -13.44 -7.17 -7.81 
Income 5.86 10.68 8.73 14.68 5.53 7.53 
University Completed -2.12 -2.55 4.19 2.67 -1.89 -2.10 
Values represent the change in probability resulting from a one-standard deviation increase in the respective 
independent variables. Probabilities are for selected variables only. Probabilities in column two are the result of 
models that eliminate the shared variance between each of the three proximate determinants of vote choice and the 
social cleavage variables. 
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Table 5 Recoding Religiosity According to Each Survey 
Survey Values of New Attendance Measure 
0 1 2 3 
CSES "never" "once a year" "two to eleven 
times a year", 
"once a month" 
"two or more 
times a month", 
"once a week" 
ANES "never" "seldom" "often" "regularly" 
GES "less often or 
never" 
"only once a 
year" 
"more than once 
a year", "at least 
once a month" 
"at least once a 
week", "more 
than once a 
week" 
Political Change 
in Britain 
"never", "less 
than once a year" 
"once a year" "several 
times/year", 
"once a month"  
"several 
times/month", 
"once a week", 
"several 
times/week" 
Entries are the answers respondents could give in the original surveys to the respective frequency of attendance 
questions. 
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Supplementary Material 
 
Robustness Checks with CSES 2
nd
 Wave Data 
 
Comparing the results in Table S.1 (presented here) with Tables 1 and 2 in the text 
reveals that the findings using the first wave of the CSES data presented in the text are not 
specific to those particular elections.  While there are some slight differences between Table S.1 
and Tables 1 and 2, the differences are relatively minor.  The most dramatic differences are 
between the 1996 and 2004 elections in the United States, with the magnitude of the probability 
changes in 1996 surpassing those of 2004.  The probabilities, however, remain sizable in 2004, 
despite the drop from 1996.  Few would argue that issues dividing religious and secular no 
longer matter in the United States; rather, the reason for this drop is most likely due to campaign-
specific effects (consider that the 2004 election included issues surrounding U.S. involvement in 
Iraq) and measurement (using other measures of religiosity not utilized in the text improves the 
probability changes to about the same level as in 1996).  In sum, the relative stability of social 
cleavage effects demonstrated in Tables 1, 2, and S.1 provides additional evidence that the effect 
of the social cleavages in general (and religiosity in particular) on vote choice and party 
identification are far more stable than believed by the literature.   
 
Estimating the Path Model with the Addition of Party Identification 
 
 Because the Michigan model suggests that party identification is an intervening variable 
between social cleavages and the more proximate short-term forces that determine vote choice, I 
re-ran the second stage of the analysis (Tables 3 and 4 in the text).  The revised model is 
presented in Figure S.1.  Here, the effect of social cleavages on vote choice appears entirely 
indirect, mediated by party identification, which in turn affects the short-term forces of left-right 
self-placement, party leader preference, and economic evaluations.  Estimating a model with all 
of these variables included in the model would surely find that the social cleavage variables are 
insignificant. 
 As in the analyses performed in the text, here I also remove the variance in the 
endogenous variables of interest that is shared with the social cleavage variables by the same 
methods.  The one difference is with regard to party identification.  To remove the shared 
variance between party identification and social cleavages, I first run probit regression to 
estimate the linearly predicted values for party identification.  I then subtract these values from 
the observed values for party identification in order to obtain the residuals.  In theory and in 
practice, this differs little with regard to the final results of this technique, whether using the 
same model except estimating deviance residuals instead of linearly predicted residuals, or 
Pearson residuals predicted by a logit model.  Once the residuals are calculated, I predict the 
residuals from the regression models predicting the other three endogenous variables 
representing the three short-term forces in the same way as in the text, with the inclusion of the 
endogeneity-corrected party identification variable.  Results of select social cleavage variables 
on these short-term forces (comparable to Table 3 in the text), controlling for party identification, 
are presented in Table S.2. 
 The results show that, like in Table 3, the effects of the social cleavages on the short-term 
forces that are more proximate to vote choice remain sizable and significant.  This demonstrates 
that, like in the results presented in the text, once the endogeneity of the relationship between 
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party identification and social cleavages is accounted for, variables like religiosity have sizable 
and significant effects on these short-term forces variables.  Furthermore, this demonstrates that 
these variables are endogenous and that social cleavages have indirect effects on these more 
proximate determinants of vote choice (though here, the results show that these effects are also 
indirect through party identification as well). 
 Table S.3 presents the predicted probability changes of voting for conservative parties for 
a one standard deviation change in some of the respective independent variables.  The same set 
of select social cleavage variables is presented here as in the text and the results can be compared 
to Table 4.  Compared with Table 4, the results in Table S.3 demonstrate that once party 
identification effects are removed from the short-term forces, the magnitude of these effects on 
vote choice are greatly diminished.  Additionally, the magnitude of the social cleavage effects 
increases substantially.  Whereas the social cleavage effects are generally smaller than the short-
term forces in Table 4, these effects are generally larger than each of the short-term forces in 
Table S.3.  With regard to the religious-secular cleavage, this variable‘s effect far outweighs 
each of the short-term forces variables.  Additionally, and similar to the results in Table 4, even 
after controlling for those denominations most likely to support the conservative parties, the 
religious-secular cleavage appears roughly equivalent in terms of the magnitude of the 
probability changes in the dependent variable as each of the class and status variables.  Thus, the 
findings in Table S.3 lend even more support to the conclusions drawn from Table 4 in the text, 
that the religious-secular cleavage remains very salient to individual vote choice because it is a 
significant predictor of the more proximate determinants of vote choice.  
 
Parameter Estimates Accompanying Table 4 
 
 Finally, I present the parameter estimates used to produce the predicted probabilities 
found in Table 4 in the text.  Because the individual parameter estimates do not convey the 
results as efficiently as the predicted probabilities, I leave these parameter estimates out of the 
main text.  Looking at these values in Table S.4 tells much the same story as in the text.  Column 
1 for each country presents the unadjusted results of probit models including all variables 
without adjusting for endogeneity, while column 2 for each country presents the results adjusted 
for endogeneity.  Comparing columns 1 and 2 show that, like Table 4 in the text, the effects of 
the social cleavage variables are underestimated if endogeneity is not accounted for.  While 
frequency of attendance remains a significant predictor of vote choice in the United States and 
Germany when included in the same model as the three short-term forces, the coefficients are 
substantially smaller than those coefficients corrected for endogeneity in column 2.  What one 
also notices is that correcting for endogeneity does not alter the explanatory power of the model.  
Additionally, the coefficients for the short-term forces variables and their standard errors remain 
largely unchanged.  This demonstrates that correcting for endogeneity does not penalize the 
short-term forces variables.  Rather, all that correcting for endogeneity does is to attribute all 
variance (direct and indirect through the short-term forces variables) to the social cleavage 
variables.   
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Table S.1 Parameter Estimates for Probit Models and Respective Changes in Probabilities 
with 2
nd
 Wave of the CSES (Similar to Tables 1 and 2 in the text) 
 
Variable    UK  USA         Germany 
    2005  2004  2002 
Vote Choice 
 
Attendance   .129*  .115*  .248** 
    (.050)  (.043)  (.049) 
     4.94   5.38   9.38 
 
Religious   .359*  .386**   .369** 
Denomination    (.123)  (.112)  (.103) 
     5.76   7.13   6.46 
 
Union    -.545**  -.628**  -.393* 
Member    (.154)  (.168)  (.134) 
    -7.53  -7.41  -5.38 
 
Income    .136*   .096*   .052 
    (.045)  (.041)  (.035) 
     6.42   4.84   2.72 
 
University   -.132  -.112  .125 
Educated   (.165)  (.116)  (.115) 
    -1.71  -1.93  1.95 
 
Party Identification 
 
Attendance   .114*  .094*  .349** 
    (.053)  (.045)  (.075) 
     4.46   4.36  14.09 
 
Religious   .340*  .486**   .410** 
Denomination   (.127)  (.116)  (.152) 
     5.66   8.92   7.75 
 
Union    -.341*  -.758**  -.731** 
Member    (.151)  (.184)  (.209) 
    -4.95  -8.84  -10.77 
 
Income    .127*   .147**   .098 
    (.047)  (.043)  (.053) 
     6.30   7.48   5.51 
 
University   -.222  -.086  -.089 
Educated   (.174)  (.120)  (.170) 
    -2.98  -1.52  -1.54 
 
* Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .001 level.  The values presented are probit coefficients presented 
above their standard errors in parentheses, with probability changes for a one standard deviation change in the 
values of the respective independent variables. 
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Figure S.1 Path Model of the Effects of Social Cleavages on Vote Choice 
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Table S.2 Effects of Social Cleavages on More Proximal Vote Determinants 
(OLS Regression Coefficients, Controlling for Party Identification and Endogeneity) 
UK 1997 Religiosity Denomin-
ation 
Union 
Member 
Income University 
Education 
Adjusted 
R
2
  
Left-Right Self-
Placement 
.620** 
(.061) 
1.904** 
(.150) 
-2.818** 
(.163) 
.757** 
(.052) 
-1.731** 
(.167) 
.351 
Party Leader 
Preference 
1.036** 
(.069) 
2.419** 
(.174) 
-3.570** 
(.195) 
1.113** 
(.061) 
-1.240** 
(.231) 
.416 
Economic 
Performance 
-.152** 
(.020) 
-.508** 
(.051) 
.658** 
(.056) 
-.271** 
(.018) 
.150* 
(.064) 
.248 
  
USA 1996 Religiosity Denomin-
ation 
Union 
Member 
Income University 
Education 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
Left-Right Self-
Placement 
.795** 
(.065) 
1.411** 
(.158) 
-1.680** 
(.246) 
.466* 
(.070) 
-.406* 
(.155) 
.293 
Party Leader 
Preference 
.792** 
(.067) 
1.935** 
(.160) 
-2.798** 
(.230) 
.727** 
(.070) 
.161 
(.151) 
.392 
Economic 
Performance 
.067* 
(.027) 
.264** 
(.065) 
-.304* 
(.102) 
.057 
(.030) 
-.265** 
(.063) 
.101 
 
Germany 1998 Religiosity Denomin-
ation 
Union 
Member 
Income University 
Education 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
Left-Right Self-
Placement 
.788** 
(.130) 
.657* 
(.246) 
-.887* 
(.319) 
.253* 
(.091) 
.134 
(.289) 
.237 
Party Leader 
Preference 
1.141** 
(.151) 
.840* 
(.307) 
-1.613** 
(.376) 
.362** 
(.108) 
.358 
(.404) 
.276 
Economic 
Performance 
-.322** 
(.082) 
-.367* 
(.162) 
.477* 
(.188) 
-.103 
(.060) 
-.335 
(.217) 
.121 
* Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .001 level.  The values presented are unstandardized regression 
coefficients presented above their standard errors in parentheses. Only select coefficients are presented in the 
interest of space. 
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Table S.3 Changes in Probabilities 
 
DV: Vote Choice UK 1997 US 1996 GER 1998 
Left-Right Self-Placement 7.83 4.32 3.81 
Party Leader Preference 9.40 21.84 15.55 
Economic Evaluations -5.52 1.66 -5.02 
Party Identification 66.81 73.02 40.94 
Attendance 25.51 31.50 30.05 
Religious Denomination 31.40 28.91 12.87 
Union Member -47.21 -29.05 -18.18 
Income 49.94 27.82 16.84 
University Completed -20.73 1.47 1.72 
Values represent the change in probability resulting from a one-standard deviation increase in the respective 
independent variable. Probabilities are for selected variables only.  
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Table S.4 Probit Model Parameter Estimates  
(for the Probabilities Presented in Table 4 in the text) 
 UK 1997 US 1996 GER 1998 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
Left-Right Self-
Placement 
.270** 
(.023) 
.270** 
(.023) 
.233** 
(.035) 
.233** 
(.035) 
.182** 
(.031) 
.182** 
(.031) 
Party Leader  
Preference 
.229** 
(.017) 
.229** 
(.017) 
.546** 
(.040) 
.546** 
(.040) 
.225** 
(.025) 
.225** 
(.025) 
Economic 
Evaluations 
-.486** 
(.067) 
-.486** 
(.067) 
.295** 
(.075) 
.295** 
(.075) 
-.094* 
(.045) 
-.094* 
(.045) 
Attendance .022 
(.037) 
.194** 
(.038) 
.124* 
(.053) 
.333** 
(.054) 
-.006 
(.061) 
.184* 
(.061) 
Religious 
Denomination 
.318** 
(.093) 
.807** 
(.096) 
.205 
(.122) 
.629** 
(.123) 
.399** 
(.122) 
.550** 
(.123) 
Union  
Member 
-.283* 
(.105) 
-.691**  
(.106) 
-.461* 
(.181) 
-.963** 
(.184) 
-.577** 
(.173) 
-.658** 
(.172) 
Income .160** 
(.033) 
.322** 
(.034) 
.193** 
(.057) 
.311** 
(.059) 
.129* 
(.046) 
.184** 
(.046) 
University 
Completed 
-.240 
(.130) 
-.318* 
(.130) 
.231 
(.131) 
.140 
(.129) 
-.191 
(.197) 
-.222 
(.197) 
Women .117 
(.089) 
-.049 
(.088) 
-.341* 
(.123) 
-.687** 
(.126) 
.056 
(.123) 
-.039 
(.121) 
Region -.394** 
(.122) 
-.570** 
(.123) 
-.140 
(.130) 
-.088 
(.130) 
- - 
Urban - - -.083 
(.143) 
-.150 
(.143) 
-.159 
(.148) 
-.277 
(.149) 
Black - - -3.016** 
(.534) 
-3.397** 
(.539) 
- - 
Constant -2.666** 
(.287) 
-2.129** 
(.144) 
-6.376** 
(.473) 
-2.140** 
(.282) 
-2.823** 
(.312) 
-1.565** 
(.204) 
Likelihood  
Ratio (df) 
955.74 
(10) 
955.74 
(10) 
681.27 
(12) 
681.27 
(12) 
242.28 
(11) 
242.28 
(11) 
Pseudo R
2
  
(Cox-Snell) 
.422 .422 .509 .508 .300 .300 
n  1741 1741 958 958 680 680 
* Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .001 level.  The values presented are probit coefficients presented 
above their standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
